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The period of the “Great Recession” since 2008 has led to a downward trend 
in many indicators of support for European integration. From the point of view 
of the trust that Europeans have towards Europe (an important dimension of 
diffuse support for the EU), we can even speak of a deep crisis of trust in the 
European Union action, as recorded since 2008 in the opinions of Europeans. 
In some countries (like Greece), we even recorded a collapse of confidence. The 
analysis of two Eurobarometer studies, one at the beginning of the crisis and 
another in 2011, shows that if the collapse is certainly there, and not only on 
indicators of diffuse support towards EU integration, Europeans do not impute 
responsibility for the crisis to the EU only: Europeans perceive the crisis and the 
role of Europe in the crisis through the prism of their national experiences, in 
particular confidence in their governments and the perception of the economic 
situation of their country. Moreover, the crisis of trust in the EU does not entail 
ipso facto a serious crisis of confidence in the euro: we do not observe for euro 
a comparable collapse to that observed in terms of overall trust in the EU. 
Among euro-zone countries, evolutions are slightly declining but not very 
significantly; it is in countries that are outside the euro-zone or those who are 
candidates to enter in that the lower support for the euro can be observed.
The financial crisis that began in August 2007 in the United 
States and then spread in several European economies to become a 
sovereign debt crisis poses more than ever the question of the link 
between the action of the European Union and how people and 
citizens perceive it: the combination of financial bailouts of banks, 
fiscal policies programs and of lower tax revenues linked to the Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 134 (2014)
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significant deterioration of the budget situation and of the public 
debt ratios, as had never been seen before in peacetime.
In the 17 euro-zone countries, this situation has revealed that 
the public debts do not benefit from any institutional guarantee. 
As Patrick Artus (2012) has analyzed this very well, this situation 
strongly poses a real European dilemma and raises in a particularly 
crucial way the question of the democratic legitimacy of the Euro-
pean Union, “the choices seem a priori clear: on one side, the move 
towards a more integrated politico-economic system at the level of 
the euro-zone, on the other side, the national withdrawal, poten-
tially until the breakup of the monetary union. Although since the 
beginning of the crisis, an in-between has become, since Member 
States have chosen to favor one mode of intergovernmental deci-
sion that apparently ensures national interests and weakens the 
institutions that guarantee the common interest, such as the 
Commission and the European Parliament. At the same time, the 
decisions taken under the pressure of the financial markets are 
going in the direction of ever greater fiscal solidarity and of 
strengthened supervision rules. This in-between is probably due to 
the paradoxical situation in Europe: the combination of the 
sudden experience of economic interdependence on the one hand, 
and on the other, strong differences that lead Member States to 
want to keep a veto right on EU decisions”. 
According to Patrick Artus, this “policy of small steps, (through 
the implementation of ESM or through the strengthening the role 
of the European Central Bank) cannot provide a comprehensive 
response to “a well established systemic crisis,” neither a reply to 
the challenge of the democratic legitimacy of the European Union 
and the euro zone: “This is that deficit, i.e. the absence of a clear 
political leadership with a strong democratic legitimacy, which 
currently feed distrust among the seventeen members of the euro-
zone. On the one hand, the Southern countries affected by the 
crisis count on the financial solidarity of their partners and protest 
against austerity policies they regard as being' imposed from 
outside. On the other, some Northern countries expect structural 
reforms of their neighbours, or even an independent oversight of 
national budgets, while their citizens whose assistance is sought 
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and encourage laxity governments of other states”. 
This analysis nicely summarizes the main aspects of the deep 
crisis of trust in the European Union that we see since 2008 in the 
opinions of European citizens. Before we analyze this trend few 
methodological precautions must be posed. First, any analysis of 
the evolution of public opinion must take the time dimension in 
consideration: the less favorable assessment that Europeans relate 
to European integration does not date from the current crisis. It 
dates from the early 1990s when the conjunction of the “post-1989 
world” and public debates on the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty introduced in public opinion a series of questions about the 
limits, the scope and meaning of economic and political European 
integration. In addition, the indicators that measure the attitudes 
of European citizens vis-à -vis European integration have been the 
subject of lively debates in academic research literature: these 
researches reflect the question of the views of European citizens 
towards the EU in terms of “support”, a concept which itself is 
linked in the tradition of political analysis to the question of the 
democratic legitimacy of the EU. These researches make a distinc-
tion between the “diffuse support” and the “specific support”, a 
distinction coming from David Easton analysis who had suggested 
in the 1960s that any political system owed its stability to a 
“diffuse support” of citizens defined in terms of “feelings of trust or 
affection” while it was in the same time evaluated by the citizens in 
terms of functioning. This distinction is, in the literature on Euro-
pean citizens attitudes towards European integration, endorsed by 
a distinction which is almost isomorphic: the one made by Fritz 
Sharpf between support by the “inputs” and by the “outputs”: on 
the one hand political choices are legitimate if they reflect the will 
of the people expressed through the mechanisms of political 
participation or speaking up in civil society, on the other hand 
political choices are legitimate if they are finalized with respect to 
the collective good and the good functioning of the system.
These methodological considerations are important because, 
from the point of view of the analysis of the reactions of citizens 
towards the crisis and the European integration, and towards the 
EU in the crisis, we cannot avoid the question of whether the 
effects of the crisis are on “specific” or “diffuse” support levels: in 
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and communicating circuit between the two levels, diffuse support 
being in his words, a “reservoir of favorable attitudes” which can 
compensate for the loss of “specific” support when the political 
system does not “deliver” to its citizens. In this latter case, the 
crisis of trust that we see in the EU action does not question the 
commitment and the general support of Europeans towards the 
overall objectives of European integration and a significant leeway 
exist for the EU to create (or resuscitate...) the public demand for 
European public policies.
The table below compares some indicators of these two forms of 
support from two Eurobarometer surveys in 2009 and 2011, one 
survey at the beginning and the other one at middle of the crisis. 
Even limited to a few indicators, the comparison shows a clear fall 
in support for the EU and its actions whatever the “diffuse” or 
Table 1. The two forms of European citizens support towards EU
% for the EU27 members in 2009 and 2011
EB71.1 (2009) EB76.3 (2011)
%
% 
« dont’ 
know
% % « dont’ know»
« Diffuse » 
support
In favor of a monetary 
union with only one 
currency, the euro
64 7 56 8
Membership to EU is 
a « good thing » 53 4 – –
Trust in the European 
Union 50 11 39 10
In favour of EU enlarge-
ment to other countries  
in the coming years
48 12 43 11
« Specific » 
support
(*)
In favor of 
more decision 
taken at the 
EU-level to
Fight against terrorism 80 4 82 2
Fight for environment  
protection 73 4 66 2
Fight against 
unemployment 61 5 39 2
Trust in the European 
Commission 47 22 40 20
Positive image of EU 44 2 33 2
Things are going in the 
good direction in the EU 36 11 23 9
Sources: Eurobarometer 71.3, June-July 2009; Eurobarometer 76.3, November 2011. Data have been analyzed by the 
author and weighted.
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negative impact on the general or specific support to EU actions or 
institutions. 
 Other indicators from more recent or complementary to Euro-
barometer surveys complete the picture. At the most general level 
of support for European integration (“diffuse” support), the spring 
2012 Eurobarometer records (for the first time since the creation of 
this indicator) equality between positive and negative opinions 
about the functioning of democracy in the European Union. While 
in 2007 and until 2009, only 32% of Europeans declared them-
selves dissatisfied with the way EU functions, in 2012 the increase 
was 12 points at the same time that the number of satisfied went 
down by 10 points. At this very general and diffuse level of support 
for the EU, this decline is particularly striking. And dissatisfaction 
gains dramatically in Greece (from 40% in 2007 to 70% in 2012), 
but also in Spain (14% in 2007, 30% in 2009 and 52% in 2012), 
Italy and Portugal (37% in 2007, 39% in 2009, 66% in 2012). These 
countries, both exposed to the reality of the crisis and the condi-
tionality of the aid to rescue their banking sector and restructuring 
of public debt, are more than any other the theatre of a real 
collapse of the trust in the EU. The image of the EU is of course also 
deteriorated not only for the overall European level (20% of Euro-
peans in the Spring 2011 Eurobarometer have a negative image of 
the European Union against 15% in 2007), but also very deterio-
rated in the countries who were highly exposed to the crisis: the 
negative image of the European Union now brings 40% of Greeks 
(13% in 2007), 25% of Portuguese (12% in 2007) or 16% of Spanish 
(6% in 2007). While these evolutions are strongly or very strongly 
downward we can nevertheless observe that the negative image of 
the EU remains at levels below 50%.
These data are well summarized by the indicator of trust in 
European integration. Many researches have shown the link 
between political trust and support for the political system; polit-
ical trust is an essential dimension of “diffuse” support”, one of the 
most synthetic indicators of this support. Declining trust in the EU 
since 2008 is first strong and widespread: there are only two coun-
tries among the 27 members of the EU in 2011 for which there is 
increasing trust in the EU compared to 2007: Sweden (+2 points) 
and Finland (+10 points), two countries whose levels of pro-EU 
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ions were able to welcome the affirmation of budgetary rules at 
European level. But in all other countries, “large” or “small” Euro-
pean countries, regardless of the time of accession to the EU, net 
“contributors” or “recipients”, we are witnessing a particularly 
significant drop in trust (Armigeon and Ceka , 2014).
Nevertheless, these data do not allow to assign the responsi-
bility for the collapse of support for European integration in the EU 
alone: Europeans perceive the crisis and the role of Europe in the 
crisis through the prism of the national experience they have had 
of it, in particular trust in their governments and the perception of 
the economic situation in their countries (Hobolt et al., 2013). It is 
also the confidence in national governments and in particular the 
confidence in the ability of these governments to cope with the 
economic crisis that is involved. 
But what about support for the euro? One might expect that the 
support for the euro experiencing a very important decline in trust: 
as Patrick Artus summarized in its analysis, the governance of the 
euro area is actually at the heart of issues of legitimacy and citizens 
support, including their “diffuse” dimensions. If the level of 
support for the euro has actually declined between 2008 and 2012, 
there has not been a comparable collapse to that observed in terms 
of the overall trust in the EU. In countries members of the euro-
zone the evolutions are slightly declining but not are not very 
significant. And it is remarkable to see the small differences 
between the countries members of the euro-zone who are 
“debtors” (those exposed to austerity plans and constraints of the 
EU and the IMF) and those who are “creditors”. The collapse of 
support for the euro still exists elsewhere, but outside the euro-
zone, in the countries that have chosen (such as the United 
Kingdom) not to join the euro-zone but also in countries which are 
candidate to join the euro-zone. A recent work by Sara Hobolt thus 
clearly shows that in the countries of the euro-zone, the majority 
of citizens still think that the European Union is more able to 
resolve the crisis than the national government (Hoblot , 2013).
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The data presented here show that the opinions of European 
citizens towards European integration do not let themselves be 
grasped by simplistic opposition between “pro” and “anti” 
European. Multidimensionality of these opinions is the rule. More 
than during the “Maastricht years”, European citizens have 
questions at several levels on European integration: the debate can 
no longer be summarized in just splitting between supporters of 
national sovereignty and “integrationist”. European integration 
has, by its own dynamics, both homogenized and heterogenized 
the representations that Europeans have the European integration 
process. “What are the contributions of the EU vis-à-vis the actions 
of national governments? Where are the limits of European public 
policy, particularly in economic matters? Europe for whom or for 
whose benefit? Where are the boundaries?”, are just some of the 
questions that now oppose popular representations schemes of 
European integration. More recently, researchers have even 
suggested that it is more the growing “indifference” to Europe than 
opposition to European integration that characterizes the 
disoriented public opinion today (Duchesne et al., 2013).
For all these reasons, it is particularly important that the main 
tool the researchers can access to analyze the dimensions of the 
opinions of Europeans toward European integration is shifted in a 
more “academic” direction. The Eurobarometer is a survey 
conducted and funded by the European Commission; if it does not 
ignore the links with the academic community, it is not fully an 
“academic” survey in the traditional sense of the term.
If Eurobarometer has contributed in a fundamental and irre-
placeable way to the development of academic research and 
constitutes one of the largest databases available to researchers and 
the public, it sometimes lacks consistency in its questionnaires and 
indicators: if a good part of the indicators to distinguish the forms 
of “diffuse” and “specific” support are there, all are not there and 
are not there systematically. The result is a sometimes optimistic 
presentation of the Eurobarometer data in reports prepared by the 
services of the European Commission. More annoying is the often 
one-dimensional nature of the collected data: too many indicators 
measure the same dimension (favorable/unfavorable to European 
integration) and too little measure alternative dimensions: Europe 
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the politicization of issues of European integration that citizens 
may give more meaning to European integration and could reduce 
the dissonance between the ideological compass used for issues of 
national politics and the absence of such ideological benchmarks 
that raise Europe in their minds (Hix and Bartolini, 2006; Belot et 
al., 2013).
Finally, it seems increasingly clear that more qualitative and 
contextual observation devices should complement the range of 
available data: the micro-social and territorial contexts of produc-
tion of political attitudes are, for European integration more than 
for any other object of analysis, fundamental to grasp.
